Abstract. Kripke recently suggested viewing the intuitionistic continuum as an expansion in time of a definite classical continuum. We prove the classical consistency of a three-sorted intuitionistic formal system IC, simultaneously extending Kleene's intuitionistic analysis I and a negative copy C
Introduction
L. E. J. Brouwer agreed with Kant that the intuition of time is a priori, but unlike Kant he considered it the basis of all mathematical reasoning. The intuitionistic continuum is composed of point cores or equivalence classes of convergent sequences of rational segments or rational numbers. The reduced continuum consists of definite, "lawlike" fundamental sequences, all of whose values are determined in advance. The full continuum also includes point cores determined by indefinite, unfinished convergent sequences whose rational values are generated by successive, more or less free, choices.
Brouwer abstracted from the full continuum to the "universal spread," his intuitionistic version of Baire space. An arbitrary choice sequence α of natural numbers is potentially infinite; at any given time, only a finite initial segment of α may have been determined. This intuition justifies Brouwer's controversial continuity principles.
In contrast, as Troelstra observed in [7] , lawlike sequences may allow classical logic. Now Kripke has proposed considering the intuitionistic full continuum as an expansion in time of the classical continuum, depending on the actions of a creating subject.
Kleene's formal system I of intuitionistic analysis, including countable choice, bar induction and a classically false continuity principle, is consistent relative to its neutral subsystem B by [4] and consistent with "there are no non-recursive sequences" by [6] . "Every sequence is recursive" is inconsistent with B by Lemma 9.8 of [4] .
Classical analysis with countable choice C (≡ B + ¬¬A → A) is classically equivalent to its negative translation, which is consistent with I. Negative formulas (no ∃ or ∨) are stable under double negation even with intuitionistic logic. Let M = (ω, C) be an ω-model of a negative version C
• of C. We define C realizability to prove classically that a three-sorted extension IC of I and C
• asserting "there are no indefinite sequences" is consistent, and does not decide "not every sequence is definite" provided C may = ω ω .
1
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1 C and C • have the same classical ω-models. C can be thought of informally as representing either classical Baire space or Brouwer's species of lawlike sequences. See also the last section of this paper.
Just the basics
For Brouwer a statement A was in general stronger than its double negation ¬¬A, since intuitionistic negation expresses inconsistency. Thus (A → ¬¬A) holds in general, as does (¬¬¬A → ¬A), but not always (¬¬A → A). Even ¬¬(A ∨ B) → ¬¬A ∨ ¬¬B fails under the constructive interpretation of disjunction; and while ∃xA(x) asserts that a witness can be designated, ¬¬∃xA(x) says only that ∀x¬A(x) is inconsistent.
Classical logic, on the other hand, can be formulated in a negative language with only &, ¬, → and ∀, since A ∨ B and ∃xA(x) are classically equivalent to ¬(¬A & ¬B) and ¬∀x¬A(x) respectively. The language L(C • ) of classical analysis C • has two sorts of variables: i, j, . . . , p, q, w, x, y, z, i 1 , . . . intended to range over natural numbers, and a, b, c, d, e, a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , . . . intended to range over sequences of natural numbers; constants for primitive recursive functions; Church's λ; parentheses, used both to denote function application and also to indicate the scopes of &, ¬, →, ∀x and ∀b in formulas; and equality = between number terms. For ease of reading we sometimes abbreviate
The Peano axioms are negative in form when the schema of mathematical induction is restricted to formulas of the negative language. The equality axiom x = y → b(x) = b(y) is negative. Primitive recursive functions have negative definitions. The axiom of countable choice is represented by its negative translation. Even with intuitionistic logic the classical law of double negation ¬¬E → E holds for formulas E of this language.
The three-sorted axiomatic system IC combines Kleene and Vesley's intuitionistic formal system I, which has variables α, β, γ, . . . ranging over arbitrary choice sequences, with the formal system resulting from C
• by extending its language and logic to include ∨, ∃x, ∃b and their intuitionistic postulates. The only new axiom explicitly connecting the two sorts of sequence variables is ∀α¬∀b¬∀x α(x) = b(x), or equivalently
The idea is that when mathematical activity has ended and all values of an arbitrary choice sequence α have been specified, it will turn out that α coincides with some definite (classical or "lawlike") sequence.
2 This correlation may not be made in advance; IC proves neither ¬∀α∃b∀x α(x) = b(x) nor ¬¬∀α∃b∀x α(x) = b(x). However, IC proves
Thus every definite sequence is extensionally equal to a choice sequence, and "at the end of time" intuitionistic and classical Baire space will be indistinguishable.
In order to establish the consistency of IC we assume a classical ω-model M = (ω, C) of C
• exists and use it to define a modified C realizability interpretation. The potential C realizers belong to ω ω and the actual C realizers belong to the recursively closed set C. All theorems of IC are C realizable but 0 = 1 is not, so IC is consistent. Kleene observed (Lemma 8.4a of [4] ) that true negative sentences of the language of I have primitive recursive realizers. All sentences of the language of C
• which are true in M are C realized by primitive recursive functions, and thus are consistent with IC.
3. The formal systems C • , B, I and IC 3.1. A negative formal system C • for classical analysis with countable choice. The two-sorted language L(C • ) was described briefly in the preceding section. Now we adopt Kleene's finite list f 0 , . . . , f p of constants representing selected primitive recursive functions, with f 0 = 0, f 1 = , f 2 = +, f 3 = · and f 4 (x, y) = x y . The list, including bounded sum and bounded product, may be expanded by definition as needed. C • -terms (type-0 terms) and C • -functors (type-1 terms) are defined simultaneously inductively. The number variables and the constant 0 are C
• -terms. The lawlike sequence variables, the successor symbol and constants representing primitive recursive functions of one type-0 argument are C
• -functors. If f i is a constant representing a primitive recursive function of k i type-0 and m i type-1 variables, and if t 1 , . . . , t k i are C
• -terms and u 1 , . . . ,
• -functor and t is a C • -term then (u)(t) (sometimes written u(t)) is a C • -term. If x is a number variable and s is a C
• -term then λx(s) (sometimes written λx.s) is a C
• -functor. This completes the definition. The prime formulas are the expressions of the form s = t where s, t are C • -terms. Equality at type 1 is defined extensionally, with a = b abbreviating ∀x(a(x) = b(x)). 1a
, where x is not free in B. 10N. ∀xA(x) → A(t), where t is a C
• -term free for x in A(x). 9C
• . B → A(b) / B → ∀bA(b), where b is not free in B. 10C
• . ∀bA(b) → A(u), where u is a C • -functor free for b in A(b).
Mathematical axioms assert that = is an equivalence relation, 0 is not a successor, is one-to-one, and x = y → a(x) = a(y). The primitive recursive defining equations for +, · and f 4 , . . . , f p (Postulate Group D of [4] , [3] ) are axioms, as is the mathematical induction schema
• -terms r(x), t the λ-reduction schema is (λx.r(x))(t) = r(t), where r(t) results by substituting t for all free occurrences of x in r(x). The axiom schema of countable choice, for formulas A(x, b) of L(C • ) with a, x free for b, is
Properties of C
• . To avoid unnecessary formal reasoning, first observe that the Deduction Theorem (Theorem 1 on p. 97 of [2] ) holds for C
• (using the same arguments for the relevant cases), so the Hilbert-style logical axioms and rules can be replaced by natural deduction rules for →, & , ¬ and ∀ (as in Theorem 2 on pp. 98-99 of [2] Note that (e) is Kleene's classical negation-elimination axiom schema 8
• , restricted in this case to negative formulas. All the logical postulates which were omitted because they contain ∨ or ∃ have negative versions provable in C
• . Proofs. 5a
• follows from an instance ¬A & ¬B → ¬A of axiom 4a by Lemma 3.2.1(c,d) and 5b
• follows from an instance of axiom 4b. For 6
• , assume A → C and B → C; then ¬C → ¬A and ¬C → ¬B, so ¬C → ¬A & ¬B using axiom 3, so ¬(¬A & ¬B) → C by Lemma 3.2.1(d,e). Similarly, 12N
• follows from 9N, and 12C
• follows from 9C
• .
3.3. Kleene's intuitionistic formal systems B and I. The neutral basic system B has axioms for two-sorted intuitionistic logic and arithmetic, countable choice and bar induction. Intuitionistic analysis I is B together with Brouwer's classically false principle of continuous choice, which is consistent relative to B by function-realizability. The language resembles a richer version of L(C • ). Instead of variables a, b, c, d, e, a 1 , . . . over classical sequences, L(B) (≡ L(I)) has variables α, β, γ, δ, α 1 , . . . intended to range over arbitrary choice sequences. In addition to =, λ, parentheses and the logical symbols &, ¬, → and universal quantifiers ∀x, ∀α, L(B) has disjunction ∨ and existential quantifiers ∃x, ∃α of both sorts. With the same constants f 0 , . . . , f p representing the same primitive recursive functions, the simultaneous inductive definition of term and functor is like that of C
• -term and C
• -functor but with α, β, . . . in place of a, b, . . ..
Prime formulas are expressions of the form s = t where s, t are terms. Compound formulas are built from prime formulas and both sorts of variables using &, ¬, →, ∨, ∀, ∃ and parentheses as needed. α = β abbreviates the negative formula ∀x(α(x) = β(x)).
The logical rules and axioms include 1a -8 I and 9N -12N, as for C • except that now A, B, C and A(x) may be any formulas of L(B); t is a term free for x in A(x); ∨ and ∃ replace • ∨ and ∃
• respectively; and 5a, 5b, 6, 11N and 12N are postulates rather than theorems. In the following replacements for 9C
• -12C
• , A(β) and B may be any formulas of L(B):
The mathematical axioms of B include those of C
• , but with α, β, . . . instead of a, b, . . . and with the following adaptations. For the mathematical induction schema, A(x) may be any formula of L(B). For the λ-reduction schema (λx.r(x))(t) = r(t) both r(x) and t are terms of L(B). The axiom schema of countable choice for B is
where A(x, α) is any formula of L(B) with β, x free for α.
Brouwer's most important contributions to the foundations of intuitionistic mathematics were his "bar theorem," which is classically valid, and his continuity principle, which is not. An axiom schema of bar induction completes Kleene's neutral system B, and the full intuitionistic system I comes from B by adding a principle of continuous choice. These are more complicated to state.
Finite sequences of natural numbers are coded formally using the function constants of L(B). In [4] f 19 (i) = p i denotes the ith prime, with p 0 = 2; f 20 (y, i) = (y) i denotes the exponent of p i in the prime factorization of y; and x 0 , . . . , x k abbreviates Π i<k p
Let Seq(y) abbreviate ∀i < lh(y) (y) i > 0, where lh(y) is a term denoting the number of nonzero exponents in the prime factorization of y. Then = 1 codes the empty sequence; x 0 + 1, . . . , x k + 1 codes the sequence (x 0 , . . . , x k ); the concatenation of the finite sequences coded by w and z (assuming Seq(w) & Seq(z)) is coded by w * z; and w * α codes the sequence defined by prefixing the finite sequence coded by w to α.
Let α(n) abbreviate the code Π i<n p
of the initial segment of α of length n (so α(0) = 1). The last axiom schema of B is the principle of bar induction (with a thin bar, essentially x 26.3c on p. 55 of [4] ), where
This description of Kleene's neutral basic system B of intuitionistic analysis summarizes Postulate Groups A-D, § §1-6 of [4] .
The full intuitionistic system I comes from B by adding a principle of continuous choice ("Brouwer's principle for a function," cf.
x 27.1 on p. 73 of [4] ): [4] ), B is a subsystem of C. Clearly C is inconsistent with I. The negative translation of AC 01 , which is consistent with I by Kleene's function-realizability, is not a theorem schema of B so C cannot be interpreted negatively in its subsystem B. 3.4. The formal system IC. In order to compare the intuitionistic continuum with a definite (either classical or "reduced") continuum, two sorts of sequence variables are needed. One sort of number variables suffices, but in IC even arithmetical formulas will not always be provably equivalent to their negative translations.
Proposition. There is a faithful negative translation
The three-sorted language L(IC) extending both L(C • ) and L(I) has three sorts of variables with or without subscripts, also used as metavariables:
i, j, k, . . . , p, q, w, x, y, z over natural numbers, a, b, c, d, e over definite (classical or "lawlike") sequences, α, β, γ, . . . over arbitrary choice sequences; finitely many constants f 0 = 0, f 1 = (successor), f 2 = +, f 3 = ·, f 4 = exp, f 5 , . . . , f p for primitive recursive functions and functionals; the binary predicate constant =; Church's λ denoting function abstraction; parentheses (,) denoting function application; and the logical symbols & , ∨, →, ¬ and quantifiers ∀ and ∃ over each sort of variable.
Terms and functors are defined simultaneously inductively as for B, except that now all definite sequence variables and all arbitrary choice sequence variables are functors. If ET were strengthened to ∀α∃b∀x α(x) = b(x) and ¬¬E → E was assumed for all C-formulas E, the result would be inconsistent by the following result. 
4.
C realizability and the consistency of IC
From now on, assume that
Then M is also an ω-model of B and C (cf. §3.3.1 above) under the classical interpretation of ∨ and ∃. Observe that C is closed under "recursive in," i.e. if γ is recursive in finitely many elements of C then γ ∈ C, so C-functors represent elements of C.
For the proof that IC is consistent it is not necessary to assume C is countable, or even that C = ω ω . The proof that IC is consistent with ¬∀α∃b∀x α(x) = b(x), on the other hand, will depend on the additional assumption C = ω ω . Kleene's curly bracket and Λ notations are described in Section 8 of [4] . Briefly, Φ[α 1 , . . . , α j , x 1 , . . . , x k , y 1 , . . . , y m ] .
The fundamental difference between modified and plain realizability was described elegantly by van Oosten: modified realizability requires two sets of realizers, the potential realizers and the actual realizers. As in [6] we avoid explicitly assigning types to our potential realizers via a notion of "agreement" which makes the types implicit.
4.2.
Definition. By induction on the logical form of a formula E of L(IC) we define when ε ∈ ω ω agrees with E, as follows, where (ε) i abbreviates λy.(ε(y)) i .
(1) ε agrees with a prime formula s = t, for each ε. Proofs. By induction on the logical form of E. Only (c) is nontrivial. If E is prime then ε E is λt.0. Given ε A and ε B agreeing with A and B respectively, let ε A&B = ε A , ε B , ε A∨B = λt.0, ε A , ε A→B = Λα ε B and ε ¬A = Λπλt.0. Given ε A(x) agreeing with A(x), let ε ∃xA(x) = λt.0, ε A(x) and ε
4.3. Definition. By induction on the logical form of a formula E of L(IC) containing free at most the distinct variables Ψ we define when a sequence ε, belonging to C, C realizes-Ψ E, where Ψ are elements of ω, C and C corresponding respectively to the number, lawlike sequence, and choice sequence variables in the list Ψ, as follows.
(1) ε C realizes-Ψ a prime formula P, if P is true-Ψ in M. A sentence E of L(IC) is C realizable if and only if E is C realized by some general recursive sequence ε, and a formula is C realizable if and only if its universal closure is C realizable. 4.3.4. Lemma. For every negative C-formula E of L(IC) (so for every formula of L(C • )) with only the distinct variables Ψ free there is a primitive recursive function τ E such that τ E agrees with E, and for each interpretation Ψ of Ψ by elements of C and ω:
Proof. For each negative C-formula E let τ E be the primitive recursive function ε E defined in proving Lemma 4.2.1(c). τ E agrees with E by the lemma, and satisfies (a) and (b) by formula induction. We give the case for E ≡ ¬A. Assume τ A satisfies (a) and (b) for A. If (ε ∈ C and) ε C realizes-Ψ ¬A, then (since 0 = 1 is false in M) no δ ∈ C can C realize-Ψ A, so A is false-Ψ in M by (b) for τ A , so ¬A is true-Ψ in M, so (a) holds for ¬A. If ¬A is true-Ψ in M then A is false-Ψ in M, so no ε ∈ C can C realize-Ψ A by (a) for τ A , so τ ¬A = Λπ λt.0 C realizes-Ψ ¬A, so (b) holds for ¬A. Logical Axioms 1a, 1b, 3-7, 10N, 11N, 10F, 11F (exactly as in [4] ) and 10C, 11C: Axioms for 3-sorted intuitionistic number theory: As in [4] , λt.0, Λπλt.0 and ΛπΛσλt.0 take care of the prime axioms, including (λx.r(x))(t) = r(t); x = y → α(x) = α(y) and axioms 14, 15, 17 from [2] ; and axiom 16 from [2] , respectively.
The mathematical induction schema (13 in [2] ) is Axiom of countable choice: AC 01 . ∀x∃αA(x, α) → ∃β∀xA(x, λy.β(2 x · 3 y )). Exactly as in [4] 1(b,c) and C realizes the axiom because if α ∈ C then Λπ λt.0 is in C and 
C realizes E(x, y). Suppose E(y) is ∃xA(x, y) where (a) and (b) hold for A(x, y) with Γ A recursive in κ.
C realizable/C and so true in M for some n ∈ ω, so E(y) is true in M. If E(y) is true in M then A(n, y) is true in M for some least n, so Γ E [y]
C realizes E(n). Thezs relative consistency proofs for restricted WKS and WWKS evidently have nothing to do with the stage-by-stage activity of a creating subject. Another approach to Brouwer's counterexamples was suggested by Richard Vesley. 4.5.3. Vesley's Schema. Richard Vesley [9] proved that the axiom schema
(with β not free in A(α)) is consistent with I and suffices to refute the universal closure of MP 1 and for other "creating subject" counterexamples. He also proved that I is consistent with a stronger "independence of premise" schema (with β not free in A): 5. Epilogue 5.1. Choice sequences revisited. At each nth stage in the generation of a choice sequence α, when α(n) has already been determined and α(n) is to be chosen, Brouwer allowed (but did not require) restrictions to be placed on all future choices, consistent with any restrictions inherited from previous stages. Many variations of his original notion appear in the literature. Troelstra's "hesitant sequences" α ([8] §4.6.2) are related to lawlike sequences b by ¬¬∃b∀xα(x) = b(x) as the choice sequences of the present model are related to elements of C, but with an additional restriction. A hesitant sequence α proceeds freely until and unless at some finite stage "in time" a particular lawlike b is deliberately correlated to α (which then becomes lawlike).
Kreisel's "lawless sequences" α ([8] §12.2), for which ¬∃b∀xα(x) = b(x) holds, are beyond the scope of our interpretation, as are projections of lawless sequences. 5.2. Understanding M. Kleene proved that while Brouwer's fan theorem is classically true for the arithmetical sequences, even all the hyperarithmetical sequences do not suffice to form a classical ω-model of C. Brouwer would have had no need for choice sequences if his reduced continuum was complete. An intuitionist might reject the idea of a definite classical continuum, a fortiori the idea of a classical ω-model of C
• or C. However, an intuitionist might understand M = (ω, C) by taking C to be the species of Brouwer's lawlike sequences and assuming that M satisfies lawlike versions of all the axioms of B except AC 01 and BI!, plus "unique choice" AC 00 ! (like AC 00 but with the stronger hypothesis ∀x∃!yA(x, y)) and the negative interpretation of AC 01 . By [3] these axioms could only prove the existence of definite, in fact recursive, sequences. From this point of view, ET simply asserts that at the nth stage in the generation of a choice sequence α, the possibility that α will turn out to be pointwise equal to a lawlike sequence cannot be excluded. This seems reasonable provided that at each stage only lawlike restrictions on future values are allowed (for example, restriction to a spread with a lawlike spread-law).
Evidently IC gives no further insight into the stage-by-stage activity of a creating subject. All we can claim is that from the perspective (unattainable by the creating subject) of the end of time, Kripke's idea is classically feasible.
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3 Apart from [6] , two related earlier investigations were pointed out to me after this work was done. V. Lifschitz [5] introduced a distinction between the constructive or "calculable" numbers and the classical natural numbers, with a formal theory (expressing both classical and recursive arithmetic) which proves that not every classical number is calculable but there is no non-calculable classical number. Birkedal and van Oosten [1] abstractly described toposes corresponding to C realizability, with elementary sub-partial combinatory algebras of ω ω playing the role of C.
